SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE — Statute of Limitations The Defense misstated the full statute of limitations. It is not 2 years from the offense but rather 6 years from the time of the offense with a limit of 2 years from the time the offense was known or reasonably should have been known. Also, there is an exception for people with a disability. The actual law is stated below: 3a.) Statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3) (from Ch. 110, par. 13-214.3)     Sec. 13-214.3. Attorneys.     (a) In this Section: "attorney" includes (i) an individual attorney, together with his or her employees who are attorneys, (ii) a professional partnership of attorneys, together with its employees, partners, and members who are attorneys, and (iii) a professional service corporation of attorneys, together with its employees, officers, and shareholders who are attorneys; and "non-attorney employee" means a person who is not an attorney but is employed by an attorney.     (b) An action for damages based on tort, contract, or otherwise (i) against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services or (ii) against a non-attorney employee arising out of an act or omission in the course of his or her employment by an attorney to assist the attorney in performing professional services must be commenced within 2 years from the time the person bringing the action knew or reasonably should have known of the injury for which damages are sought.     (c) Except as provided in subsection (d), an action described in subsection (b) may not be commenced in any event more than 6 years after the date on which the act or omission occurred.     (d) When the injury caused by the act or omission does not occur until the death of the person for whom the professional services were rendered, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the date of the person's death unless letters of office are issued or the person's will is admitted to probate within that 2 year period, in which case the action must be commenced within the time for filing claims against the estate or a petition contesting the validity of the will of the deceased person, whichever is later, as provided in the Probate Act of 1975.     (e) If the person entitled to bring the action is under the age of majority or under other legal disability at the time the cause of action accrues, the period of limitations shall not begin to run until majority is attained or the disability is removed.     (f) If the person entitled to bring an action described in this Section is not under a legal disability at the time the cause of action accrues, but becomes under a legal disability before the period of limitations otherwise runs, the period of limitations is stayed until the disability is removed. This subsection (f) does not invalidate any statute of repose provisions contained in this Section. This subsection (f) applies to actions commenced or pending on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly.     (g) This Section applies to all causes of action accruing on or after its effective date. (Source: P.A. 98-1077, eff. 1-1-15.) Dulberg's filing is well within 6 years of the date that the act or omission by MAST occurred. It is within 2 years of the date that the act or omission by MAST resulting in monetary damages was known or should reasonably have been known to DULBERG. Also, the disability exception is applicable to DULBERG's case. WHEN DID DULBERG KNOW THAT AN ACT OR OMISSION BY MAST OCCURRED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RESULTING IN MONETARY DAMAGES? Dulberg had no idea whether he suffered monetary damages as a result of an act or omission by MAST until he heard the final judgement reached in arbitration on December 08, 2016. He couldn't have known whether he suffered monetary damages as a result of an act or omission by MAST without first learning the results of arbitration, reading the findings and conclusions of expert witnesses, and learning of the opinions of other attorneys. After Dulberg stopped being represented by Mast, Dulberg contacted a tree and chainsaw expert named Dr Bobby L. Lanford, PhD. When Dulberg retained a new attorney, Dr Lanford was hired as an expert witness for Dulberg. The findings and conclusions of Dr Lanford are that both Gagnon and the McGuires were responsible for the accident. The expert witness findings and conclusions of Dr Lanford which were part of the binding arbitration agreement clearly describe how both Gagnon and the McGuires are liable for the chainsaw accident. There is no evidence that Mast consulted or planned to consult any expert witness related to chainsaws, trees, or homeowner liability law before informing Dulberg he had no case against the McGuires. If he had done so and communicated with a person who shares the same clear and reasonable opinions as Dr Lanford, Mast could easily have realized that his later advice to Dulberg was very poorly thought out. Most every lawyer with which Dulberg communicated after he stopped being represented by MAST suggested that settling with the homeowners for such a low amount was a mistake. Dulberg did inquire about the McGuires' liability on his own and from his successor counsel. His successor council told him that they believe that settling with the McGuires was a mistake. It was the successor counsel that recommended contacting an attorney that works with malpractice cases. But Dulberg still couldn't have known whether the counsel of Mast and Popovich limited his final recovery until he could find out what the recovery would be. He found that out during the arbitration hearing, understood that the actions and advice of Mast and Popovich did indeed limit his recovery, and acted promptly. THE LEGAL DISABILITY EXCEPTION IS APPLICABLE TO DULBERG Statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3) Sub-Paragraph e. and f. Listed again here: "(e) If the person entitled to bring the action is under the age of majority or under other legal disability at the time the cause of action accrues, the period of limitations shall not begin to run until majority is attained or the disability is removed.     (f) If the person entitled to bring an action described in this Section is not under a legal disability at the time the cause of action accrues, but becomes under a legal disability before the period of limitations otherwise runs, the period of limitations is stayed until the disability is removed. This subsection (f) does not invalidate any statute of repose provisions contained in this Section. This subsection (f) applies to actions commenced or pending on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly." Dulberg was found to be legally and permanently disabled from the moment the underlying injuries happened on June 28, 2011 shortly after a hearing by a Social Security Administrative Judge on April 6th of 2017. Also, Dulberg was seeing a Psychologist, Dr. McMasters, who specializes in Psychiatry and Neurology and was prescribed drugs and group therapy sessions for depression as a result of the chainsaw injuries from October, 2012 through July 2014 which was before, during and after Mast settled with the McGuires. Mast was fully aware that Dulberg had filed for Social Security Disability and even suggested the Disability Attorney: M. Margaret Bradshaw P.C. 454 W. Jackson Street Woodstock IL 60098 Ph 815-206-2908. Mast was given the referral fee by the Disability Attorney Margaret Bradshaw. Mast was also fully aware that Dulberg was seeing Dr. McMasters, a psychiatrist, and was prescribed drugs for depression before, during and after the McGuire settlement. Accordingly this matter is not time barred and we prey this Honorable Court to dismiss this affirmative defense with prejudice.