

**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MCHENRY COUNTY, ILLINOIS**

PAUL DULBERG,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No. 17 LA 377
	)	
THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J.	)	
POPOVICH, P.C., and HANS MAST,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**DEFENDANTS THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. POPOVICH, P.C. AND HANS
MAST'S MOTION/MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Defendants, The Law Offices of Thomas J. Popovich, P.C. and Hans Mast ("Mast") (sometimes collectively "Popovich") by and through their attorneys Karbal, Cohen, Economou, Silk, & Dunne, LLC, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1005, submit this Motion/Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, and state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Paul Dulberg ("Dulberg") was allegedly injured on June 28, 2011 when he was assisting a friend, David Gagnon ("Gagnon"), trim a tree with a chainsaw in the backyard of a home owned by Dulberg's neighbors, Bill and Carolyn McGuire ("The McGuires"). Gagnon, who is Carolyn McGuire's son, and Dulberg were both over the age of 40 at the time of the accident. Dulberg retained defendant Popovich to prosecute a personal injury lawsuit against Gagnon and the McGuires. Defendant Hans Mast was the primary handling attorney. Eventually, in Mast's legal opinion, the case against the property owners was weak because the evidence showed they did not control the work. Mast recommended Dulberg accept the McGuires' settlement offer. Dulberg deliberated and accepted the McGuires' offer in January 2014. Thus

McGuire's were dismissed from the lawsuit in January 2014, and Dulberg continued to prosecute the case against Gagnon.

Popovich and Mast withdrew from representing Dulberg on March 13, 2015. Dulberg later settled with Gagnon, and waited until November 28, 2017 to sue Popovich and Mast. In an unavailing attempt to excuse the late filing of his lawsuit, Dulberg alleges that he did not become aware of a claim against defendants until he sought a legal opinion in December of 2016. He has never been able to explain what legal opinion he received or how it caused him to "discover" his claim and damages, or why he still waited almost another year after December 2016 to file his lawsuit. Summary judgment must be entered because Dulberg's claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations for Illinois legal malpractice claims under 735 ILCS 13/214.3(b).

II. STATEMENT OF CLAIM

The following facts can be gleaned from the Complaint (Exhibit A), Amended Complaint (Exhibit B) and Second Amended Complaint (Exhibit C).^{1 2}

On or about June 28, 2011, Dulberg was involved in an accident while assisting David Gagnon in the cutting down of a tree on the McGuire property. Exhibit A, ¶6. Gagnon lost control of the chainsaw he was using causing it to strike Dulberg. Exhibit A, ¶7. In May 2012, Dulberg retained the Law Offices of Thomas J. Popovich. Exhibit A, ¶8. In late 2013 or early 2014, Mast met with Dulberg and agreed with Mast to accept \$5,000, releasing William and Caroline McGuire. Exhibit A, ¶13. Mast and Popovich continued to represent Dulberg through March of 2015. Exhibit A, ¶14. Thereafter, Dulberg retained other attorneys and proceeded to a binding

¹ The Complaint and Amended Complaint were filed by The Gooch Firm and signed by attorney Thomas W. Gooch, III.

² Dulberg denied the material allegations contained in Popovich's Affirmative Defenses, including its Second Affirmative Defense based on the two-year statute of limitation. (Dulberg Answer to Affirmative Defenses, Exhibit D).

mediation where he received an award. Exhibit A, ¶16. Dulberg alleges that following the execution of the mediation agreement and final mediation award, he realized for the first time that the information Mast and Popovich had given him was false and misleading and that the dismissal of the McGuires was a serious and substantial mistake. Following the mediation Dulberg was advised to seek an independent opinion from an attorney handling malpractice matters, and received that opinion on or about December 16, 2016. Exhibit A, ¶20.

In his First Amended Complaint, Dulberg modified his “discovery” allegations and alleged “it was not until the mediation in December 2016, based on the expert’s opinion that Dulberg became reasonably aware that Mast and Popovich did not properly represent him by pressuring and coercing him to accept a settlement for \$5,000 on an “all or nothing” basis. Exhibit B, ¶29. In ¶30 he reiterates that “Dulberg was advised to seek an independent opinion from a legal malpractice attorney and received that opinion on or about December 16, 2016.” Exhibit B, ¶30.

Dulberg’s first substitute counsel in this case filed a Second Amended Complaint, further modifying the allegations. It is alleged that “after accepting a \$5,000 settlement, Dulberg wrote Mast an email on January 29, 2014 stating that “I trust your judgment.” Exhibit C, ¶48. He further alleges in ¶55 of Ex. C that “only after Dulberg obtained an award against Gagnon did he discover that his claims against the McGuires were viable and valuable.” Exhibit C, ¶55. He also alleges that following the execution of the mediation agreement and the final mediation award, Dulberg realized for the first time in December of 2016 that the information that Mast and Popovich had given Dulberg was false and misleading and that the dismissal of the McGuires was a serious and substantial mistake. Exhibit C, ¶56. He alleged that it was not until the mediation in December 2016 based on the expert’s opinions that Dulberg retained for the mediation that Dulberg became reasonably aware that Mast and Popovich did not properly represent him by pressuring and

coercing him to accept a settlement for \$5,000 on an "all or nothing" basis. Exhibit C, ¶57. Dulberg's allegations of Popovich' breaches of the standard of care are contained in Exhibit C, ¶58 as follows:

58. Mast and Popovich, jointly and severally, breached the duties owed Dulberg by violating the standard of care owed Dulberg in the following ways and respects:
 - a) failed to fully and properly investigate the claims and/or basis for liability against the McGuires;
 - b) failed to properly obtain information through discovery regarding McGuires assets, insurance coverages, and/or ability to pay a judgement and/or settlement against them;
 - c) failed to accurately advise Dulberg of the McGuires' and Gagnon's insurance coverage related to the claims against them and/or Dulberg's ability to recover through McGuires' and Gagnon's insurance policies, including, but not limited to, incorrectly informing Dulberg that Gagnon's insurance policy was "only \$100,000" and no insurance company would pay close to that;
 - d) failed to take such actions as were necessary during their respective representation of Dulberg to fix liability against the property owners of the subject property (the McGuires) who employed and/or were principals of Gagnon, and who sought the assistance Dulberg by for example failing to obtain an expert;
 - e) failed to accurately advise Dulberg regarding the McGuires' liability, likelihood of success of claims against the McGuires, the McGuires' ability pay any judgment or settlement against them through insurance or other assets, and/or necessity of prosecuting the[sic] all the claims against both the McGuires and Gagnon in order to obtain a full recovery;
 - f) Coerced Dulberg, verbally and through emails, into accepting a settlement with the McGuires for \$5,000 by misleading Dulberg into believing that he had no other choice but to accept the settlement or else "The McGuires will get out for FREE on a motion."

III. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

A. Paul Dulberg Testimony

Dulberg has hired a personal injury attorney in 2002 and has hired a corporate lawyer in the past. (Dulberg Deposition, Exhibit E, pp.8, 9). He was injured on June 28, 2011 while assisting David Gagnon with a chainsaw cutting up some branches after they were removed from a tree. (Exhibit E, pp.12, 13). He hired Popovich to sue Gagnon and Bill and Carolyn McGuire in connection with his June 28, 2011 injury. (Exhibit E, pp. 9, 30). Hans Mast was the primary handling attorney. (Exhibit E, p. 30). Brad Balke substituted for Dulberg on March 19, 2015 when Popovich withdrew. (Exhibit E, p. 35). Dulberg asked hundreds of lawyers to take over his case when Popovich withdrew, but none accepted. (Exhibit, E, p. 36). Dulberg fired Balke prior to the binding arbitration, and he was then represented by the Baudin Law Firm. While Brad Balke handled the case, Balke never gave him an opinion as to the liability of the McGuires and whether the prior settlement was appropriate. (Exhibit E, p. 42). At some point, Dulberg hired The Daley Disability Law Firm to assist him with a Social Security disability claim. A criminal lawyer represented him in a guilty plea for drug possession in 1990. (Exhibit E, pp.34-35) (Exhibit E, p. 43). At some point during the case, it was Hans Mast's opinion that the McGuires did not have liability because they did not control the work David Gagnon was doing. (Exhibit E, pp. 50, 51). Mr. McGuire was inside the house for 45 minutes before the accident happened. (Exhibit E, pp. 51, 52).

On November 18, 2013, Mast emailed Dulberg and relayed a \$5,000 settlement offer from the McGuires. (Exhibit E, p.52). Mast suggested that the \$5,000 offer be accepted. Dulberg testified that at one point, "Mast defined what an independent contractor is and he said that David was an independent contractor and the McGuires weren't liable because they had hired somebody

outside even though it's their own son, he is an adult, outside to do the work and that they weren't responsible." (Exhibit E, p.55). Dulberg believed that Mast was relying on his honest legal opinion at the time. (Exhibit E, p.59). Dulberg did not accept the settlement offer on November 8, 2013. Dulberg met with Mast on November 20, 2013. (Exhibit E, p.61). Then Dulberg reviewed the depositions of the McGuires and David Gagnon before he accepted the offer. (Exhibit E, p.63). Eventually Dulberg told Mast that he would agree to accept the \$5,000 settlement offer from the McGuires, just before Christmas in December of 2013. (Exhibit E, p.66) Dulberg received a letter with a settlement release from Mast on January 29, 2014 and signed it and sent it back. (Exhibit E, p.69). From December 25 until he received the settlement release, he contacted Mast again to discuss whether it would be appropriate to let the McGuires out for \$5,000. (Exhibit E, p.70). Dulberg did not talk to any other lawyers and there was nothing preventing him from seeking a second opinion from some other lawyer at the time. (Exhibit E, p.71). Dulberg emailed Mast with a question about the release on January 29, 2014, and then put a stamp on the envelope with the executed release, put it in his mailbox, put the flag up, and waited for the mailman. (Exhibit E, pp. 71, 72). Mast did not force him to take the settlement. (Exhibit E, p.73).

The case continued against Gagnon through discovery and some of Dulberg's doctors were deposed. (Exhibit E, pp. 78, 79). Dulberg told Mast "First, I'm sorry that I'm not a better witness to prove David cut me with a chainsaw." Dulberg already started looking for new lawyers in the summer of 2014. Mast thought the case against David Gagnon was difficult. (Exhibit E, p.81). Mast told Dulberg that he did not make a good witness at his deposition. (Exhibit E, p.82). Dulberg and Gagnon were the only people who witnessed the accident. (Exhibit E, p.83). There were differences between the factual testimony provided by Gagnon and Dulberg in the underlying

case. (Exhibit E, p.83). His relationship with Mast was deteriorating over the fall and winter of 2015, even long before that. (Exhibit E, p.86). On February 22, 2015, Dulberg wrote in an email to Mast "Now I'm left wondering... how hard it is to sue an attorney?" (Exhibit F). When asked what the reference to suing an attorney meant he replied:

A. That was me being angry.

Q. With Hans?

A. Yes. I was seeing red.

Q. You're suggesting that you may sue him?

A. Yeah. I didn't know that I could. I'm wondering about it.

Q. You, basically, made a threat, whether it be a veiled threat or an overt threat to sue him, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You, ultimately, sued him for legal malpractice, right?

A. Yes.

On February 22, 2015, Mast wrote in an email to Dulberg "Paul, I can no longer represent you in the case. We obviously have differences of opinion as to the value of the case." (Exhibit E, p.91). Mast speculated that seven out of ten times he would lose the case outright. (Exhibit E, p.92). Dulberg filed for bankruptcy. He was ordered by the bankruptcy trustee to participate in binding mediation on December 8, 2016. (Exhibit E, p.96). Dulberg admitted that the allegation in his complaint regarding Popovich being involved with the high/low agreement in the mediation was a mistake. (Exhibit E, p.103). Dulberg testified that it was Baudin that advised him to seek an independent opinion from an attorney handling legal malpractice matters. (Exhibit E, p.108). The lawyer he received the legal opinion on December 16, 2016 was Thomas Gooch, the drafter of the Complaint in this case. (Exhibit E, p.108). It was confirmed by Gooch on December 16,

2016 that Dulberg had a valid case against Popovich. (Exhibit E, p.113). He did not file a lawsuit until nearly a year later because “Thomas Gooch had some health issues and that his wife had some health issues. It took a while.” (Exhibit E, p.114). Dulberg agreed that the legal opinion he received on December 16, 2016 was responsive to Interrogatory No. 1 from Dulberg’s answers to Mast’s Interrogatories. (Exhibit E, pp.125, 126). The legal opinion Dulberg received from Gooch was verbal. (Exhibit E, p.130). Gooch simply stated, “You have a case here. You have a valid case.” (Exhibit E, p.130). When asked did he tell you exactly what they did wrong in connection with your – their representation of you, Dulberg replied “He probably did. I’m not recalling it right now. I’m pulling a blank.” (Exhibit E, p.131).

Dulberg was questioned further: “Other than you have a case, what did Gooch say to you?” Dulberg responded, “He said they definitely committed malpractice.” When asked whether Gooch ever put this in writing, Dulberg replied, “I think he backed it up by filing a suit. That’s documented.” (Exhibit E, p.136). Dulberg was asked, “As you sit here today, other than you have a case against Popovich and Mast, what did Gooch tell you specifically that was any different than what Mast and Popovich told you with respect to the McGuires’ liability? Answer: They were definitely liable. He tried to say that – like Popovich and Mast were first – or second year lawyers and that they may have made a mistake here.” (Ex. E, pp.139-140).

B. Hans Mast Testimony

Mast graduated from Kent Law School in 1991 and has been admitted to practice law in Illinois since 1991. (Mast Deposition, Exhibit G, p.10). He joined the Popovich firm in 2001 and worked there for approximately 18 years. (Exhibit G, p.12). He testified that every time he met with Dulberg: “Every time we met, we talked about this because this was the subject at the time with the McGuires and the testimony of the McGuires, given Paul’ testimony, given the lack of

any evidence that they were controlling any work or even knew what Paul was doing, I felt it was a big, high risk at moving forward on that claim.” (Exhibit G, p.43). Mast thought Paul’s case was going to be very difficult to prove based on the testimony of everybody, credibility issues, and the lack of evidence to support and prove. (Exhibit G, p.77). Gagon’s testimony regarding the facts surrounding the accident differed from Paul Dulberg’s version of the facts. (Exhibit G, p.77). Mast took that difference in testimony into account in his evaluation and his analysis of the case. (Exhibit G, p.77). Mast also took into account Paul Dulberg’s poor performance as a witness at his discovery deposition. Mast’s analysis and evaluation of the case hinged in part on whether the McGuires controlled the method of the use of the chainsaw. Mast testified that the McGuires were inside the house and not paying attention to what was going on outside at the time of the accident. (Exhibit G, p.78). Mast’s recommendation or suggestion that Dulberg settle the case for \$5,000 against the McGuires was based on his analysis of the entire case, including the risks and benefits of going forward and potentially losing the case at trial. (Exhibit G, pp.78,79). Based on his professional judgment, Mast suggested that Dulberg attempt to settle the matter as opposed to taking it to trial against the McGuires. (Exhibit G, p.79).

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact but to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. *N. Ill. Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana, & Kopka, Ltd.*, 216 Ill. 2d 294, 305 (2005). Summary judgment is proper if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Id.* A defendant moving for summary judgment may meet the initial burden of production by either affirmatively showing that some element of the case must be resolved in

defendant's favor, or by showing the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff's position on one or more elements of the cause of action. *Hutchcraft v. Independent Mechanical Industries, Inc.*, 312 Ill App. 3d 351, 355 (4th Dist.,2000). The plaintiff is not required to prove his case at the summary judgment stage; in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, he must present a factual basis that would arguably entitle him to a judgment. *Robidoux v. Oliphant*, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (2002).

V. ARGUMENT

Dulberg's legal malpractice claim against Popovich is time barred by the two (2) year statute of limitations set forth in 735 ILCS 5/2-614.3.

735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) reads as follows:

- (b) An action for damages based on tort, contract or otherwise (i) against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services [...] must be commenced within 2 years from the time the person bringing the action knew or reasonably should have known of the injury for which damages are sought.

735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b).

While Popovich denies breaching any standard of care or proximately causing Dulberg any damages, assuming *arguendo* there was malpractice, Dulberg knew or should have known of his injury and that it was wrongfully caused when Popovich withdrew. In the alternative, Dulberg should have investigated any potential claims when he questioned the appropriateness of settling with the McGuires.

In his various pleadings, Dulberg alleged that Popovich concealed his malpractice and coerced him to settle with the McGuires, but his own testimony does not bear out any such concealment. He also attempts to plead that he did not discover the malpractice and his injury until December 12, 2016, but his anticipatory pleading is not supported by his own testimony. Under any analysis, Dulberg knew or should have known of the alleged malpractice

and his injury by the time Popovich withdrew. Dulberg fails to meet his burden of proving a discovery date that would toll the limitations period.

To state a cause of action for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must allege facts to establish (1) the defendant attorney owed the plaintiff client a duty of due care arising from an attorney-client relationship, (2) the attorney breached that duty, (3) the client suffered an injury in the form of actual damages, and (4) the actual damages resulted as a proximate cause of the breach." *Nelson v. Quarles & Grady*, 2013 IL App (1st) 123122 at [*P28], citing *Fox v. Seiden*, 382 Ill. App. 3d 288, 294 (1st Dist. 2008). A legal malpractice suit is by its nature dependent upon a predicate lawsuit. *Claire Associates v. Pontikes*, 151 Ill. App. 3d 116, 122 (1st Dist. 1986). Thus, a legal malpractice claim presents a "case within a case." *Id.* "[N]o malpractice exists unless counsel's negligence has resulted in the loss of an underlying cause of action, or the loss of a meritorious defense if the attorney was defending in the underlying suit."

The two-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice under 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b) incorporates the discovery rule which delays commencement of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known of the injury or that it may have been wrongfully caused. *Scheinblum v. Schain Banks Kenny & Schwartz, Ltd.*, 2021 IL App. (1st) 200798 at [*P24], quoting *Dancor International, Ltd. v. Friedman, Goldberg & Mintz*, 288 Ill. App. 3d 666 (1st Dist. 1997). Under this rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the injured party "has a reasonable belief that the injury was caused by wrongful conduct, thereby creating an obligation to inquire further on that issue." *Scheinblum* at [*P24] citing *Janousek v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP*, 2015 IL App (1st) 142989. Under the discovery rule, "a statute of limitations may run despite the lack of actual knowledge of negligent conduct." *SK Partners I, LP*, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 130 (1st Dist. 2011). A "person knows or reasonably should know an injury is 'wrongfully caused' when

he or she possesses sufficient information concerning an injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct had occurred.” *Janousek* at [*p13]. Under Illinois law, the burden is on the injured party to inquire further as to the existence of a cause of action. “When a plaintiff uses the discovery rule to delay the commencement of the statute of limitations, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the date of discovery.” *Dancor* at 673. Identification of one wrongful cause of the plaintiff’s injuries initiates his limitations period as to all other causes. *Carlson v. Fish*, 2015 IL App (1st) 140526 at ¶39.

In *Blue Water Partners, Inc. v. Mason*, 2012 IL App (1st) 102165, the Appellate Court again had the occasion to examine the discovery rule under the two-year legal malpractice statute of limitations. The court ruled that the statute of limitations begins to run when the purportedly injured party “has a reasonable belief that the injury was caused by wrongful conduct, thereby creating an obligation to inquire further on that issue.” *Blue Water Partners* at [*P51]. In that case, the court found little dispute that the plaintiff acted on its obligation to inquire further on possible wrongful conduct when consulting with an attorney about potential claims, albeit the Plaintiff lacked diligence in filing the suit.

In the recent Illinois Supreme Court case *Suburban Real Estate Servs. v. Carlson*, 2022 IL 126935, the court distinguished between transactional malpractice and legal malpractice arising out of litigation. The court explained that when the attorney’s negligence arises out of underlying litigation, no injury exists, and therefore no actionable claim arises, unless and until the attorney’s negligence results in a loss of the underlying cause of action. The court explained that in “this type of legal malpractice claim, commonly referred to as a ‘case within a case,’ the allegation is that the client suffered a monetary loss and but for the attorney’s negligence the client would have recovered in the underlying litigation.” *Suburban Real Estate* at [*P19] and [citing *Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke*,

Bosselman & Weaver, 222 Ill. 2d 218 (2006). In *Fox v. Seiden*, 382 Ill. App. 3d 288 (1st Dist. 2008), the appellate court analyzed the requirement of actual damages and held that where malpractice was alleged in the prosecution of a case, the entry of judgment in that underlying case, as opposed to the payment of judgment, is sufficient to establish the element of damages in order to state a legal malpractice claim. *Fox* at 297, 299. Here, the settlement with the McGuires was executed by January 29, 2014, and they were dismissed with prejudice in January 2014. (Dismissal Order, Exhibit H).

On its face, Dulberg's legal malpractice complaint is time barred. He bears the burden of proving a date of discovery that can salvage his claim, but Dulberg has not and can never meet that burden. Dulberg's deposition testimony and pleadings are vague and inconsistent with respect to how Popovich breached the standard of care, and when and how he became aware that his injury was wrongfully caused. As discussed, Dulberg's own testimony refutes many of his allegations of concealment, undue influence and coercion.

Dulberg has fiddled with his "discovery" allegations, going back and forth as to when and how he became aware of his malpractice claim and damages. First, he plead that he sought a legal opinion, and received that opinion on December 16, 2016. The legal opinion was supplied by the same attorney who filed his first two pleadings in this case. Then he changed his pleading and theory and attempted to rely on discovery by virtue of the report of a "chainsaw expert" he read in connection with the December 2016 mediation. However, he actually received the opinion (Exhibit I) in July 2016 but "you don't catch everything the first time you read it." (Exhibit D, p.141). Notably the report from Dr. Lanford is dated much earlier, February 27, 2016 and was addressed to Dulberg's then attorney, Randy Baudin.

Here defendants painstakingly attempted to seek discovery as to how Popovich allegedly breached the standard of care, and when and how Dulberg became aware of any damages. Dulberg's discovery responses and deposition testimony were repeatedly evasive. See Dulberg testimony, Exhibit D, pages 106 to 141. This behavior continued and caused the need for a motion to compel (See Group Exhibit J, Motion to Compel, Motion to Supplement Motion to Compel, and July 19, 2021 transcript from hearing).

Moreover, Dulberg's dissatisfaction with Popovich's representation surfaced much earlier, and he even threatened in writing to sue Mast as early as February 22, 2015. Dulberg, no "babe in the woods" when it comes to experience with litigation retention, met with "hundreds" of attorneys and had opportunity after opportunity to investigate and inquire as to whether Popovich breached the standard of care and caused him any damage in connection with the case (including prosecution of the case against Gagnon and the McGuires). The many cases cited above establish the Plaintiff's duty to inquire, and here Dulberg had the tools, the information, and opportunity to inquire. His contrived late discovery of his claims and damages should not be countenanced by this court. He was clearly questioning whether he should agree to accept the McGuires' offer, and he deliberated on it extensively. Nothing prevented him from seeking a second opinion. Likewise, nothing prevented him from inquiring of Mr. Balke or the Baudin firm whether his injury was wrongfully caused. Summary Judgment must be entered as his claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

VI. CONCLUSION

Wherefore, Defendants, The Law Offices of Thomas J. Popovich, P.C. and Hans Mast, pray that the motion for summary judgment be granted, that summary judgment be entered in its favor and against Plaintiff, and for any other relief that this court deems just and appropriate.

Dated: September 15, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

KARBAL, COHEN, ECONOMOU SILK & DUNNE, LLC

By: /s/ George K. Flynn

George K. Flynn (ARDC #6239349)

200 So. Wacker Drive
Suite 2550
Chicago, Illinois 60606
Tel: (312) 431-3700
gflynn@karballaw.com