

From: Paul Dulberg pdulberg@comcast.net 
Subject: 318 Cases from December meeting 2 of 3
Date: April 18, 2019 at 10:38 AM
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appointed to you and we will not ask questions until he has been appointed—"I told him, without his attorney I wouldn't talk to him and that would be it. That he didn't have to say anything." (He said he didn't want a lawyer.) (5) If you decide to answer now with or without a lawyer, you have the right to stop questioning at any time or stop questioning and consult a lawyer—"I told him, if I start talking to you and it becomes apparent to you that you suddenly think you want an attorney to tell me and we will stop right there and we won't ask any further questions at that point. In other words, he could stop me from asking anything, at any time and I will just stop and leave the room." (He said he still wanted to talk to me.)

Dickett testified that she gave defendant the *Miranda* warnings one at a time, speaking slowly. After each one she asked defendant if he understood and he said he did. She testified that she told him the word attorney meant lawyer and instead of the phrase, "appoint a lawyer", she told him the court would give him a lawyer.

In contrast to this questioning by Kill and Dickett, Smith testified that she interviewed defendant on December 15, 1989, six months after the fire. In questions she posed which were intended to determine whether or not he could intelligently waive what are commonly known as "Miranda rights or Miranda warnings" she would ask him "what does this mean, and then I would say what the particular right was" and his reaction would be to "look around, scratch his head and draw a blank. He didn't say anything." From these reactions she concluded that "he didn't understand what these rights meant."

The contrast in the manner in which the police officer and assistant State's Attorney advised the defendant and the form of the questions posed to the defendant by the psychologist lead us to the conclusion that the record does not support the trial court's conclusion that defendant did not understand his rights and therefore did not knowingly and intelligently waive them. The court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress is not supported by the record.


Here we find the defendant was advised of his right to remain silent and his right to

have an attorney present in language he could understand. He was advised that anything he told the officer could be used against him in court. Defendant then stated that he wanted to tell the police about the fire. He repeated the story to the officer and to the assistant State's Attorney in a coherent manner. Although he was asked to do so, he chose not have his statement taken down verbatim in writing. Since he was unable to read, he could not verify what a written statement contained.

While the State has a heavy burden to show that a defendant has waived his constitutional rights in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner, (*Brownell*, 79 Ill.2d at 516, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181) we find the State has met that burden. We find the weight of the evidence establishes that defendant waived his *Miranda* rights in a knowing and intelligent manner. For all of the foregoing reasons the order of the trial court granting defendant's motion to suppress his statements is reversed.

REVERSED.

RAKOWSKI, P.J., and EGAN, J., concur.



217 Ill.App.3d 952

578 N.E.2d 33

Byong K. CHOI, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMMONWEALTH EDISON
COMPANY, Defendant-
Appellee.

No. 1-89-2177.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Third Division.

July 10, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1991.

Independent contractor's employee
brought action against owner of nuclear

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power plant to recover for injuries sustained when he slipped and fell on wet concrete floor. The Circuit Court, Cook County, Dean Sodaro, J., granted summary judgment for owner, and employee appealed. The Appellate Court, Cerda, P.J., held that owner's duty to maintain safe workplace did not include mopping up water that accumulated on floor when snow and ice from pipes used in construction project melted onto floor, causing puddles of water.

Affirmed.

1. Judgment ¶185(2)

Although plaintiff does not have to try his case on defendant's motion for summary judgment, he must provide factual basis which would arguably entitle him to judgment.

2. Appeal and Error ¶949

Determination that summary judgment is appropriate will not be reversed absent abuse of trial court's discretion such that plaintiff's right to fundamental justice is violated.

3. Negligence ¶32(2.10)

Landowner owed duty to independent contractor's employee to maintain reasonably safe workplace.

4. Negligence ¶50

Landowner's duty to independent contractor's employee to maintain reasonably safe workplace did not extend to taking precautions against water tracked inside from natural accumulation outside.

5. Negligence ¶2, 10

Duty is determined by considering number of factors, including foreseeability of harm, likelihood of injury, magnitude of burden of guarding against it, consequences of placing that burden on defendant, public policy, and social considerations.

6. Negligence ¶29, 44

Landowner owes no duty where natural accumulation of snow, ice or water exists on outside or is tracked into building by pedestrian traffic.

7. Negligence ¶28

Property owner has duty and may be liable in negligence when injuries are result of unnatural or artificial accumulation of snow, ice or water, or natural condition aggravated by owner's use of area and creation of condition.

8. Negligence ¶50

Duty owed by owner of nuclear power plant to independent contractor's employee to provide reasonably safe workplace did not include duty to mop up water that accumulated on concrete floor when snow and ice from pipes being brought in from outside for use in construction project melted onto floor, causing puddles of water, where there was no evidence that owner did anything to aggravate that condition, but instead condition was continuation of natural accumulation.

Lane and Munday, Thomas J. Nathan, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Johnson, Cusack and Bell, Ltd., John W. Bell, Michael B. Gunzburg and Thomas H. Fegan, Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

Presiding Justice CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Byong K. Choi, brought this action against defendant Commonwealth Edison Company seeking recovery for injuries sustained when plaintiff fell on a concrete floor while working at a construction site. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists. In addition, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to recognize defendant's duty to provide a safe workplace for workmen engaged in construction work on its premises and by failing to extend that duty to include taking precautions against the accumulation of water inside the building.

On January 10, 1979, plaintiff Choi was employed by Universal Power Piping, Inc. (UPP) as a welder at the Dresden Nuclear Power Plant, which is owned by defendant

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tracked into a building from a natural accumulation on the outside. The trial court made no finding whether the accumulation inside the building was natural or unnatural, but did state that the water began as a natural accumulation of snow and ice on the pipes outside, and was brought into the building the same way as people tracking it on their feet. The trial court did not consider the expert's affidavit and deposition because it was not factually based. The expert did not actually examine the premises, the court noted, but merely looked at photographs.

After the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider, plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order. Plaintiff's argument emphasizes that Commonwealth Edison owed him a duty to maintain a safe workplace even though he was employed by an independent contractor hired by Commonwealth Edison. He asserts that the duty included mopping up water that accumulated on the building's floor when snow and ice from the pipes melted onto the floor, causing puddles of water. Plaintiff relies on cases holding that the landowner owes a duty to the employee of an independent contractor if the owner retains sufficient control over the contractor's work. *Claudy v. City of Sycamore* (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 990, 120 Ill.Dec. 812, 524 N.E.2d 994; See *Haberer v. Village of Sauget* (1987), 158 Ill.App.3d 313, 110 Ill.Dec. 628, 511 N.E.2d 805; *Tsourmas v. Dineff* (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 897, 113 Ill.Dec. 758, 515 N.E.2d 743; *Weber v. Northern Illinois Gas Co.* (1973), 10 Ill.App.3d 625, 295 N.E.2d 41; *Pasko v. Commonwealth Edison Co.* (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 481, 302 N.E.2d 642. These cases state that the duty owed is to maintain a reasonably safe workplace.

Even if the water began as a natural accumulation on the outside, plaintiff asserts, Commonwealth Edison's intervening acts caused the water to be unnaturally accumulated on the inside of the building. In the alternative, plaintiff states, the condition was aggravated by Commonwealth Edison because it would not allow the pipes to be stored inside where the snow and ice could be safely removed after it melted. Furthermore, plaintiff argues, the pipes were brought in from the outside and load-

ed onto an overhead crane operated by a Commonwealth Edison employee. The overhead crane then took the pipes to the third floor of the building, where UPP employees transported the pipes through a tunnel into the reactor building. By the time the pipes reached the third floor, the snow and ice was melting, and water from the pipes was dripping on the floor. It is on that water that plaintiff fell and injured himself.

Defendant responds that the water was a natural accumulation tracked in from the outside by UPP employees, including plaintiff. It asserts that this situation should be treated the same as a natural accumulation tracked in from the outside by pedestrian traffic, thus creating no duty by the landowner.

Defendant relies on two types of cases: those concerning natural accumulations of snow, ice or water outdoors and those concerning snow, ice or water tracked into a building from the outside, whether tracked in by pedestrians' shoes, coats or umbrellas. In *Lohan*, 140 Ill.App.3d at 172, 94 Ill.Dec. 680, 488 N.E.2d 679, the plaintiff slipped and fell on water that had been tracked from the outside into the common hallway of the defendants' stores. The appellate court ruled that the owners did not have a duty to continuously remove the tracks left by customers who had walked through the natural accumulations of snow or water outside, tracking them inside. Even if the owner has knowledge that the accumulation caused a dangerous condition, the court stated, there is no duty if the accumulation is natural. (*Lohan*, 140 Ill.App.3d at 173, 94 Ill.Dec. 680, 488 N.E.2d 679.) See also *Handy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.* (1989), 182 Ill.App.3d 969, 131 Ill.Dec. 471, 538 N.E.2d 846 (summary judgment in favor of defendant store affirmed where plaintiff slipped and fell on water located within store); *Shoemaker v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center* (1989), 187 Ill.App.3d 1040, 135 Ill. Dec. 446, 543 N.E.2d 1014 (hospital had no duty to clean up natural accumulation of water tracked into hospital on pedestrians' coats and umbrellas); *Serritos v. Chicago Transit Authority* (1987), 153 Ill.App.3d 265, 106 Ill.Dec. 243, 505 N.E.2d 1034 (city transit authority had no duty where plain-

tiff fell on snow and slush covered steps of bus owned and operated by defendant).

[1, 2] The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists. (*Haberer*, 158 Ill.App.3d at 316, 110 Ill.Dec. 628, 511 N.E.2d 805.) It may be granted if the pleadings, exhibits, affidavits, and depositions on file establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Ill.Rev. Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c); *Branson v. R & L Investment, Inc.* (1990), 196 Ill.App.3d 1088, 1090, 143 Ill.Dec. 689, 554 N.E.2d 624.) Although the plaintiff does not have to try his case, he must provide a factual basis which would arguably entitle him to judgment. (*Handy*, 182 Ill.App.3d at 972, 131 Ill.Dec. 471, 538 N.E.2d 846.) The determination that summary judgment is appropriate will not be reversed absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion such that the plaintiff's right to fundamental justice is violated. *Breeze v. Payne* (1989), 181 Ill.App.3d 720, 727, 130 Ill.Dec. 386, 537 N.E.2d 453.

[3-5] Commonwealth Edison owed plaintiff the duty to maintain a reasonably safe workplace, but it did not extend to taking precautions against water tracked inside from a natural accumulation outside. Duty is determined by considering a number of factors: the foreseeability of harm (*Breeze*, 181 Ill.App.3d at 727, 130 Ill.Dec. 386, 537 N.E.2d 453), the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant, public policy, and social considerations. *Dealers Service & Supply Co. v. St. Louis National Stock*. (1987), 155 Ill.App.3d 1075, 1080, 108 Ill.Dec. 664, 508 N.E.2d 1241.

[6, 7] In Illinois, a landowner owes no duty where a natural accumulation of snow, ice or water exists on the outside or is tracked into a building by pedestrian traffic. (*Lohan*, 140 Ill.App.3d at 172, 94 Ill.Dec. 680, 488 N.E.2d 679.) However, a property owner does have a duty and may be liable where the injuries are a result of an unnatural or artificial accumulation, or a natural condition aggravated by the owner's use of the area and creation of the condition. (*Handy v. Sears, Roebuck &*

Co. (1989), 182 Ill.App.3d 969, 971, 131 Ill.Dec. 471, 538 N.E.2d 846.) To establish a duty, the plaintiff must make an affirmative showing of an unnatural accumulation or an aggravation of a natural condition before recovery will be allowed. (*McCann v. Bethesda Hospital* (1979), 80 Ill.App.3d 544, 549, 35 Ill.Dec. 879, 400 N.E.2d 16.) Plaintiff made no such showing in this case.

[8] Therefore, summary judgment for defendant was proper. The water in the nuclear power plant was a continuation of a natural accumulation. There was no evidence presented that Commonwealth Edison did anything to aggravate the condition. To require an owner of a construction site to follow workmen around and immediately clean up any melting snow, ice or water that had been brought in from the outside would be too high a burden.

Affirmed.

WHITE and GREIMAN, JJ., concur.



217 Ill.App.3d 958

578 N.E.2d 37

FISTER/WARREN, successor in interest to Charles L. Fister and Associates, Inc., a corporation; Charles L. Fister and Robert J. Warren, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Counter-Defendants-Appellees,

v.

BASINS, INC., a Wyoming corporation, and Georgia Marble Company, a Georgia corporation, Defendants-Appellees/Counter-Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Nos. 1-90-2260, 1-90-2882.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Sixth Division.

July 12, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1991.

Stock sellers brought action against buyer of corporation and corporation, seek-